

**Page Denied**

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Madam President, I have an amendment at the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), for himself and others, proposes an amendment numbered 2134:

At the end of the resolution, add the following:

(9) declares its intent to reduce substantially the Soviet official presence within the United States in order to establish real equivalence with the official United States presence in the Soviet Union.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Madam President, despite the fact there has been a trend developing here in the Senate relative to possible amendments to this resolution, I think it is important that we consider at least one more amendment.

I know the entire body here recognizes it is appropriate that the Senate of the United States and the Congress express their position relating to the horrendous act of the Soviet Union in shooting down an unarmed commercial air liner and destroying 269 innocent people who were aboard that airplane.

The President has proposed certain actions that will be taken that will express the revulsion of the American people for this kind of act.

I believe, however, we should do more than the President has suggested, as did the Senator from North Carolina, and the amendment that I offer is one that was originally included in some similarity in the amendment by the Senator from North Carolina, but which he altered and struck from his amendment due to the fact that we were offering one very similar.

This amendment is cosponsored by Senator GOLDWATER, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee of the Senate, Senator LEAHY, Senator INOUYE, Senator EXON, Senator CHILES, Senator HELMS, Senator PRYOR, Senator WILSON, and myself and, perhaps, others of whom I have not been advised, requesting that their names be included.

This amendment would declare the intent of the United States to reduce substantially the official Soviet presence in the United States in order to establish a level of equivalence with the U.S. presence in the Soviet Union.

Madam President, this amendment really ought to be passed irrespective of what has happened with the Soviet action against the Korean air liner. But that gives an added impetus for taking this particular action.

In simpler terms, Mr. President, this amendment would reduce the total number of positions available to the Soviet Government for placement of trained intelligence officers in the United States. In other words, we would make their jobs more difficult, and we would do it in such a way as to preserve a general balance between our Nation's representation in Russia and their representation here.

Today, the total number of Soviet Government employees in the United States is about 1,000, while the number of U.S. Government employees in the Soviet Union is about 300.

Mr. SYMMS. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I yield.

Mr. SYMMS. I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Madam President, to continue, more than half of the Soviet numbers in this country are attached to the U.N. Secretariat and the Soviet U.N. mission and these we cannot change under U.N. policies. However, the official presence, which includes Soviet employees of Aeroflot, Amtorg, the Soviet trade corporation, and other Soviet operations, as well as the diplomatic corps, leaves a disparity of more than 100 between our numbers and theirs.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates that some 40 percent of the Soviet Government employees here are trained professional intelligence officers of the Soviet KGB and Soviet military intelligence—the GRU. Many other Soviet officials are used by the KGB and GRU to perform intelligence assignments.

The time has come to draw the line so that the Soviets can no longer take advantage of the imbalance that has existed for so long in this area.

This amendment gives us this opportunity, and I can think of no better vehicle than this resolution of condemnation of the Soviet Union for the Senate to express its will in this matter.

I would also like to address questions that might be raised about this amendment.

First, what is the intended meaning of the terms "official presence" and "equivalence?"

The amendment has been written in order to include employees of the Soviet Government who are assigned to the United States. It is not limited to accredited diplomats. However, it is not intended to include Soviet Government employees assigned to the United Nations, such as Soviet Government employees working at the U.N. Secretariat and the Soviet U.N. missions.

There is no question that some Soviets assigned to the United Nation are used by Soviet intelligence and include Soviet intelligence officers. In 1979 two Soviet employees at the United Nations without diplomatic immunity were caught redhanded in espionage and were tried, convicted, and sent to jail. They were later exchanged as part of an international arrangement. Despite the fact that Soviet intelligence uses the United Nation for espionage and other intelligence purposes, the diplomatic and political costs to the United States of attempting to reduce the Soviet official presence at the United Nations are probably not worth the gains. This means that the

amendment will not affect the 518 Soviet officials currently assigned to the United Nation.

The term "official presence" does include more than just Soviet diplomats. For example, in New York City alone there are 41 Soviet Government employees assigned to the Amtorg Trading Corporation. Other Soviet commercial establishments in the United States employ about 24 Soviet nationals. Beyond that, here in Washington the Soviets have not only the Embassy itself and its compound on Chesapeake Bay, but also the Office of Trade Representative, Information Department, Military Office, Maritime Office, Agriculture Office, Office of Fisheries Affairs, and the Consular Office. There is also a separate Construction Office. Many of the Soviet Government employees in these offices are not accredited diplomats, but they deserve to be counted in determining the size of the Soviet official presence.

According to statistics as of August 1, 1983, there were 461 Soviet Government employees assigned to the United States, not counting those at the United Nations. This includes 16 Tass News Agency employees and 18 other correspondents. I believe it would not be necessary to count these Soviet Government employees in determining "equivalence" with the official U.S. presence in the Soviet Union. No doubt some of them are intelligence officers or agents; and I can assure you that no U.S. journalist in the Soviet Union is working for the CIA. Nevertheless, there are enough other positions to reduce elsewhere, without having to deal with the Soviet news media.

The terms "official presence" and "equivalence" give the United States the flexibility to address the most serious aspects of the imbalance. This requires including more than just accredited diplomats. However, it does not necessarily mean including everyone employed by the Soviet Government when there might be a risk of action, for example, against American journalists in the Soviet Union.

Based on the figures as of August 1, the action required by the amendment would reduce the number of Soviet Government employees permitted in the United States by about 100 in order to match the official U.S. presence in the Soviet Union.

The second question is what are the risks to the United States in terms of possible Soviet retaliation against U.S. officials in the Soviet Union?

There is no doubt that the action required by this amendment might result in some kind of response by the Soviet Union. However, the likelihood of that risk has been taken into account in drafting the language of the amendment. The amendment does not expell diplomats or require any other action directed at specific individuals. Instead, it reduces the permissible ceiling to a level equivalent to the official U.S. presence in the Soviet Union.

that simply enforces the normal and accepted principle of reciprocity? What grounds would they have to retaliate against a rule of equivalence?

Of course, we know that the Soviets do not need reasonable grounds to justify their conduct, but this amendment does not give them an excuse to retaliate.

Equally important, by including more than just accredited diplomats in the meaning of the term "official presence," the amendment makes it possible to lower the ceiling for Soviet positions by focusing on the Soviet commercial establishments. The United States has no office in the Soviet Union comparable to Amtorg, the Soviet commercial establishment in New York City. Therefore, the Soviets would not have a convenient target to go after if we insisted in reducing or eliminating the Amtorg office.

Overall, in the final analysis it is necessary to weigh the totality of the benefits and possible risks to the United States. Reducing the Soviet official presence in the United States is not a symbolic gesture, because the size of that presence creates direct and immediate dangers to the national security of the United States. Cutting back on the numbers will clearly inhibit the ability of Soviet intelligence to operate in this country. In my judgment, that benefit itself outweighs the risks.

Madam President, I reserve the remainder of our time.

• Mr. PRYOR. Madam President, I would like to say a few words in support of the amendment by the Senator from Kentucky.

A recent series of articles by the New York Times described the nature and extent of present KGB activities in the Western democracies.

The Times referred to a U.S. Government report which concluded that the last 10 years of Western technology collection by the Soviet intelligence agencies have saved the Warsaw Pact countries "hundreds of millions of dollars" and "years in development time." The stolen Western technology aided the modernization of the pact's weapons industry, weapons performance, and the development of countermeasures to Western military capability.

The U.S. Government report went on to say that the manpower levels which Soviet intelligence agencies have allocated to this effort "have increased significantly since the 1970's to the point where there are now several thousand technology collection officers at work. These personnel, under various covers ranging from diplomats to journalists to trade officials, are assigned throughout the world."

Evidence indicates that among legal Soviet residents of Western nations, 30 to 40 percent are officers in the KGB or the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence organization.

For these reasons, I believe that the Senate has a duty to adopt the Huddleston amendment today. •

the Senator from Kentucky yield me a couple of minutes?

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I yield the Senator from Vermont 2 minutes.

Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I join my distinguished colleague from Kentucky, Senator HUDDLESTON, in offering an amendment to declare the intent of the United States to reduce the official Soviet presence in this country to the approximate level of American Government employees in the Soviet Union. In calculating the number of Soviet officials in the United States, we would naturally exclude Soviet representation to the United Nations in New York.

Madam President, I support this measure as an effective, responsible protest against the brutal Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines flight 007, killing 269 innocent civilians. Equalizing the Soviet official presence in the United States with that of our country over there will not damage the ability of the two nuclear superpowers to maintain diplomatic contacts. In the nuclear age, we and the Soviets must continue to talk and to negotiate, above all in the area of arms control. I commend again President Reagan's refusal to delay the Geneva negotiations or strategic and intermediate range weapons. Nevertheless, let us show our revulsion and anger in deeds as well as word • • • as this amendment will do.

Let me review the statistic provided by the FBI on the Soviet presence in the United States. Setting aside the 518 Soviet officials accredited to the United Nations, there are some 454 other Soviet Government representatives living and working in the United States. That later figure includes TASS correspondents, who are employees of the Soviet Government. The FBI informs me that around 40 percent of all Soviet employees work for various intelligence arms of their government.

Madam President, I recently visited the Soviet Union in a delegation headed by the distinguished ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator PERL. A central purpose of our trip was to do what we could to help the arms control situation. Hardly had we landed in the United States after this mission of good will than we learned of the terrible Korean Air Lines tragedy.

While in Moscow, I viewed firsthand the abysmal conditions under which our people must live and work. I witnessed the tight controls over the lives of American officials. We have only some 300 U.S. Government employees in the Soviet Union. There is, as I understand, no official numerical ceiling on our representatives, but there may as well be. Our people are jammed into overcrowded, dilapidated, appallingly inadequate quarters.

I visited with many of them last month in Moscow. We seem to make it very easy for the Soviet Union to have accommodations far more luxurious than their people would have in their own country, when they come here, but we do not see any kind of recipro-

not get anywhere near as nice accommodations for its people. Even if we wanted to send more people, we could not until new facilities are available. As far as I could see, it will be years yet before our new chancery and living quarters will be completed. Meanwhile, the Soviets are quite comfortable in their new Embassy compound.

There is a disparity of some 150 between Soviet and American Government employees in each other's countries—again, excluding the enormous Soviet U.N. Mission in New York. A phased reduction of the Soviet official presence in the United States to approximately the number of American employees in the Soviet Union would not only be a strong signal of our outrage over the KAL incident, it would contribute to balance and equity between the two countries in the treatment of each other's representatives.

Madam President, there has been a good deal of criticism here today about our continued pursuit of arms control with the Soviet Union. Some have alluded to alleged Soviet violations of arms agreements and treaties. I regret this exploitation of the Korean Air Lines tragedy to attack the arms control process. Outrage over this callous act should not be used for such purposes. It sullies our expressions of grief and loss over the victims.

Frankly, I, too, am concerned about ambiguous and unexplained Soviet behavior regarding the unratified SALT II treaty and the ABM treaty. But, I refuse to allow the Korean airliner episode to deflect me from my determination to support mutual, verifiable arms agreements that strengthen American security and reduce the risk of war. When in the Soviet Union, I presented Chairman Yuri Andropov with a statement outlining my concerns about arms control compliance. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my statement to Chairman Andropov appear at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. LEAHY. Even though it should have no bearing, the Korean Air Lines incident does underline a fundamental reality I attempted to convey to Soviet leaders: Their lack of restraint can and will erode the political base of support for the arms control process in the United States unless they show a greater sensitivity to genuine American concerns about their behavior. Unless the Soviet Union can be made to understand how its actions affect American attitudes, I fear for the future of arms control. What a monumental tragedy it would be if, by ignoring basic norms of international behavior and by refusing to respond appropriately to legitimate American questions about compliance with arms control agreements, the Soviet Union were to destroy the broad support for arms control which now exists in this country.

message to the Soviet Union. We can do this by adopting this amendment to equalize official representation.

# EXHIBIT 1

## STATEMENT TO CHAIRMAN YURI ANDROPOV (By Senator Patrick Leahy)

Mr. Chairman, I have come to Moscow for one overriding purpose: to underline my deep and growing concern that the arms control process is in jeopardy.

Perhaps you know that my colleagues and I are strong advocates of verifiable arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union. I supported the SALT II Treaty, and I earnestly hope the Geneva negotiations will soon lead to equitable agreements.

However, in all frankness, I must tell you that questionable Soviet activity regarding existing formal and informal arms agreements is causing me increasing concern. Although there are important issues relating to the possible use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, my main concerns at this meeting are about the unratified SALT II Treaty which both sides say they will observe, and the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty.

I am worried by reports that the Soviet Union is testing two new intercontinental ballistic missiles, when the SALT II Treaty permits only one. Perhaps even more worrisome for the future of verifiable arms control is the level of encryption of telemetry from Soviet strategic missile tests. Access to telemetry is necessary to verify compliance with important provisions of SALT II as well as any future treaty with qualitative limitations. Recently, there have also been press reports of the construction in the Soviet Union of a large phased array radar in a location which could be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to debate these matters. My intention is to explain to you the widening distress among all members of the United States Senate, Republican and Democrat, regarding your country's activities. Arms control supporters like myself can't defend the arms control process when Soviet behavior raises legitimate questions which remain unanswered.

Not only may the political basis for American observance of SALT II thus be weakened, a climate is being created which will make Senate approval of any future arms agreement much more difficult. For the United States to ratify any treaty, two-thirds of the 100 senators must agree. Whether they do or not will depend mainly on the past Soviet arms control record.

There may be valid explanations for all these activities. As one who firmly believes mutual, verifiable arms reductions and limitations are good for both our countries, I urge you to resolve our concerns. This would immeasurably strengthen those in the United States who are convinced that arms control can reduce the terrible threat to our peoples of a nuclear catastrophe.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Madam President, will the Senator yield me a couple of minutes?

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I became a cosponsor of this amendment because either last year or the year before we held hearings before the Intelligence Committee on this very subject, and what the amendment states is already the law.

and told him he had this weapon he can use with any country, the equivalency of diplomatic representation, and I do not think anybody can give us an accurate figure of how many Soviets are working in this country against our country. But we do have slightly in excess of 200 in the whole of Russia, and eyeball-to-eyeball intelligence just exists over there.

So this is already the law, and I would just like to impress once again on the President that he has this power if he wants to use it, if he can get the timid State Department to do something about it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. MCCLURE. Madam President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Yes, I will yield.

Madam President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes.

Mr. MCCLURE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Madam President, I make the same unanimous-consent request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I make the same request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. FORD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, if the Senator from Kentucky for the moment will reserve the remainder of his time I make three points: The overriding one is that the administration has asked us to send the President this measure declaring the action of the Soviet Union to be a crime so that he may sign it today; that in 2 days there will be a unanimous action by the House, the Senate, and the President in conformity.

For the first time in the history of the Senate, we will have declared the behavior of another government to be a crime. No stronger action could be contemplated. To dilute it with matters extraneous to that central assertion seems to those of us who have been voting to keep the House resolution intact and not to go to conference, to be the wise move.

make, Madam President, that the Senator from Arizona, the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, is altogether correct. The Foreign Missions Act of 1982 gives the President not just the power that he has to demand parity, but instructs him to demand parity and require it and obtain it if necessary by refusing the admission of foreign diplomats where there is not parity.

What we need is more American diplomats in the Soviet Union. And this would work directly contrary to that objective and policy, or should be policy.

Third, Madam President, I hope we would not get to use this occasion for minimal concerns. We are talking about a crime. We are not talking about the accreditation of vice counsels.

There are crimes going on right now. Six years ago in this body I introduced legislation, and have done so in every Congress, that asks the Government of the United States to force the Soviet Embassy, soon to be on Mount Alto, the highest site in the District, to stop intercepting phone calls of American citizens, including Members of this body—a crime if an American does it. It is something the Soviets do here, in New York, in San Francisco, and in Chicago, about which we do nothing. And this body, filled with brave souls in these matters, has not chosen to do a thing about that. It seems to me rather more relevant than the number of press attaches and KGB agents.

The distinguished chairman says there is not much eyeballing in the U.S.S.R. He does indeed know that the principal source of intelligence in the Soviet Union is the budget of the United States of America and the Congressional Record. They can have that mailed to Toronto if they really got down to it.

But, without in anyway wishing to demean the purposes of this—I know the Senator from Kentucky is as frustrated, as all of us have been after our hearings on the Intelligence Committee, that the State Department has not done what it can do and which the law directs them to do—I would, even so, suggest that this is an inappropriate vehicle, given the urgency of getting this matter to the President's desk tonight. Therefore, reluctantly, because the Senator from Kentucky knows the regard with which I hold him and the Senator from Arizona knows the fear in which I hold him, when the Senator from Kentucky has completed his time, I shall move to table the resolution.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Will the Senator from New York yield?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. May I ask Mr. President, how much time I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. For the reasons so eloquently stated by the Senator from New York, I would urge the Senator from Kentucky to seriously consider withdrawing his amendment so that we can promptly act upon the resolution and send it to the President for his signature, as he had hoped, tonight. And I will make this assurance to the Senator from Kentucky: that the next time he offers his proposal, I will be a cosponsor of it.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. If the Senator will yield to me for a minute, I will tell him that I will give him that opportunity. Because if the fate of this amendment is what has been the fate of the others, I do intend to offer it as a subsequent resolution.

However, in view of the arguments made by the Senator from New York, which support this amendment so strongly, that it is necessary, I must say that I agree with him. I think we ought to do something about the Soviet intelligence presence in this country. I would like to close the San Francisco Consulate, and I originally had it in this amendment, but I thought we ought to try to be a little more moderate at this time.

There is tremendous imbalance here. And our poor old FBI that has to look out for all these folks would like very much to see a reduction in their presence here. The CIA is another matter. They look at it from a different standpoint.

But, at any rate, I think it is well to go ahead and consider this and give the Senate an opportunity to vote. This would add I think some more substance to the resolution. The President would have no reason to really oppose this. As the Senator from New York says, it is what should be done anyhow.

Before the Senator makes the motion, I wanted to make sure, for those who indicated they wanted to be cosponsors, that their names were received at the desk. Let me remind you, Mr. President, that Senators ARMSTRONG, MCCLURE, HAWKINS, BOREN, JOHNSTON, COHEN and FOX, in addition to those already listed, have indicated their desire to be cosponsors.

As far as I know, no one else is seeking time on this.

Mr. CHILES. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I yield the time I have remaining to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I just wanted to complement the Senator on offering of this amendment. It seems to me this is a very legitimate way in which we can respond. I think it is responsible.

It seems to me that we do a disservice if we do not very strongly express to the Russians the commitment of our feelings and how deep those feelings are, on the subject. We have talked in many ways about the need to try to get our allies to go along with us. And I think that is true; I think we need to do that.

I think, again, we want to keep our hands off of the arms talks and try to allow those to progress. I think we want to be careful that we do not take some steps that are irresponsible.

It seems to me what the Senator from Kentucky is reaching in his amendment is a very responsible way.

Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator from New York yield me 30 seconds?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to do so.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask the majority leader and the manager of the bill on the minority side what their forecast is for final passage. The reason I ask is that Senator MARTINGLY and I are on the horns of a very unpleasant dilemma, because we both would like to vote for final passage and vote for this very severe condemnation of the Soviet's behavior but, on the other hand, there is a memorial service for Congressman McDonald, who, of course, was one of the victims of this tragedy. The memorial service is in our home State of Georgia and we must depart on an airplane in order to make that.

I would just like to get some feel so we can make a judgment about how we handle this impossible choice.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me to reply, I am sympathetic in the extreme. The junior Senator from Georgia also mentioned this to me. I cannot think of a more difficult conflict; that is to say, a memorial service for Congressman McDonald, on the one hand, and final passage of this resolution of condemnation, on the other.

I wish I could offer some advice on how to proceed. I cannot.

All I can say is that I hope that we will get to final passage on this measure within the next 45 minutes. There are several other amendments, but I begin to get the feeling that there may not be other rollcalls, except final passage, with the exception of the Huddleston amendment.

Mr. NUNN. If there is going to be any kind of delay for any reason to accommodate other Senators on final passage, I hope both sides of the aisle would consider starting the vote at the earliest possible time on final passage so that Senator MARTINGLY and I could record our strong feelings on this subject.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I assure the Senator I will make every effort to do that.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to lay on the table the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky. The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. LAXALT) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. PRESSLER) are necessarily absent.

Mr. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. GLENN), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG) are necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber wishing to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 49, nays 45, as follows:

(Rollcall Vote No. 252 Leg.)

#### YEAS—49

Abdnor	Goldwater	Perry
Andrews	Gorton	Proxmire
Baker	Grassley	Quayle
Biden	Hart	Rudman
Bochowitz	Hatch	Sarbanes
Burdick	Hatfield	Simpton
Byrd	Hecht	Stafford
Chafee	Heinz	Stennis
Danforth	Jepson	Stevens
Denton	Kassebaum	Thurmond
Dixon	Lugar	Tower
Dole	Mathias	Trible
Domenici	Matsunaga	Tsongas
Durenberger	Moynihan	Warner
Eagleton	Murkowski	Weicker
Evans	Nunn	
Garn	Pell	

#### NAYS—45

Armstrong	Ford	Melcher
Baucus	Hawkins	Metzenbaum
Bentzen	McClure	Mitchell
Bingaman	Helms	Nickles
Boren	Huddleston	Packwood
Bradley	Humphrey	Fryer
Bumpers	Inouye	Randolph
Chiles	Johnston	Riegle
Cochran	Kasten	Roth
Cohen	Kennedy	Sasser
D'Amato	Lautenberg	Specter
DeConcini	Leahy	Symms
Dodd	Levin	Wallop
East	Mattingly	Wilson
Exon	McClure	Zorinsky

#### NOT VOTING—6

Cranston	Hollings	Long
Glenn	Laxalt	Premier

So the motion to lay on the table amendment No. 2134 was agreed to.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 12363

*September 15, 1983*

**SENATE RESOLUTION 222—CALLING FOR A REDUCED SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AS A RESULT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF KOREAN AIR LINES FLIGHT 007**

Mr. HUDDLESTON submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

**S. Res. 222**

Whereas, the United States is shocked and outraged over the actions of the Soviet Government on August 31, 1983, which led to the destruction of Korean Air Lines flight 007, with the loss of 269 lives;

Whereas, Korean Air Lines flight 007 was an unarmed, clearly-marked civilian airliner with innocent men, women, and children of 13 nationalities aboard;

Whereas, the Congress believes appropriate sanctions must be imposed upon the Soviet Government in order to demonstrate that the actions of August 31, 1983, represent unacceptable behavior;

Whereas, the official Soviet presence in the United States is substantially greater than the Official United States presence in the Soviet Union; Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States should reduce the Soviet official presence within the United States in order to establish substantial equivalence with the official United States presence in the Soviet Union.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, earlier today my amendment to House Joint Resolution 353, regarding the destruction of Korean Air Lines flight 007 on August 31, was tabled. I am, consequently, introducing my amendment as a separate sense of the Senate resolution and will seek to find another vehicle to which to attach it.